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A CORPORATION'S SECURITIES LITIGATION GAMBIT:
FEE-SHIFTING PROVISIONS THAT DEFEND AGAINST
FRAUD-ON-THE-MARKET
lN'l'RODUC'l'ION

A major issue in today's corporate landscape is the growth of
shareholder litigation. The typical types of claims brought by
shareholders are derivative claims and class action claims. Specif
ically, derivative claims aimed at merger transactions were filed
in over 90% of corporate mergers and acquisitions valued at $100
million since 2010. 1 As for securities class action claims-the topic
of this comment-there have been an average of 191 filings per
year since 1997.2 Of the 166 securities class action claims in 2013,
84% involved Rule lOb-5 claims.3 Claims alleging a violation of
Section lO(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 contend
that the company made fraudulent misstatements or omissions
that violate federal securities laws. 1 The ability to bring class ac
tion suits has its foundation in both statutory regimes and com
mon law principles.5 These class action suits typically involve ex
tremely high costs for the defendant corporation.(\ As with any
high cost debate, there are arguments on both sides that deserve
merit. On one hand, shareholders have a right to hold those liable
for fraud accountable for their actions and to seek relief.7 On the
1. Lisa A. Rickard, Delaware Flirts with Encouraging Shareholder Lawsuits, WALL
ST. J. (Nov. 14, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/lisa-rickard-delaware-f1irts-with-encour
aging-shareholder-lawsuits-1416005328.
2. COHNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS-2013 YEAR IN
REVIEW 1 (2014), available at https://www.cornerstone.com/GetAttachment/d88bd52725b5-4c54-8d40-2b 13da0d0779/Securities-Class-Action.Filings-2013-Year-in•Review. pdf.
While there has been a decline in the number of filings in recent years, there was an in
crease in the number of filings from 2012 to 2013. Id.
3. Id. at 1, 7.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
5. Class Action: An Overview, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/
class_action (last visited Apr. 3, 2015).
6. See infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
7. SEC. EXCII. COMM'N, How CAN INVESTORS GET MONEY IlACK IN A FRAUD CASE
INVOLVING A VIOLA'l'ION OF THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS'/, http://www.sec.gov/answers
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other hand, there is a strong argument that many of the claims
brought by these class actions are frivolous and ultimately do not
provide any meaningful relief to shareholders. 8
Sometimes chess players employ a strategy called a gambit in
their opening move. The idea behind a gambit is that a player
will strategically sacrifice one of his pieces, typically a pawn, hop
ing to gain an advantage later on in the match. This comment
proposes that, in light of recent decisions by the Supreme Court of
the United States and the Delaware Supreme Court, corporations
can effectively protect themselves by adopting fee-shifting provi
sions (the corporation's gambit) 0 into either the corporation's arti
cles of incorporation or bylaws. Fee-shifting provisions would al
low for a more streamlined landscape of securities fraud litigation
by deterring frivolous or meritless suits. Both parties will benefit
by saving corporations significant amounts of litigation costs,
which ultimately will have the effect of increasing, or at least
maintaining, the shareholder's investment. 1 ° Furthermore, due to
the nature of discovery involved in these suits, fee-shifting will
provide a more accurate figure of the compensation paid to suc
cessful plaintiffs.
The foundation for the argument proposed by this comment has
only recently surfaced, but support can be found in similar corpo
rate contracting doctrines and furthered by practical policy con
cerns.11 A major difficulty in analyzing securities class action
suits is that a majority of them are disposed of before trial, rather
than going to trial on the merits. 12 This ultimately leads to a huge
/recoverfunds.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2015).
8. See infra Part III; U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES: THE REAL COSTS OF U.S. SECURI'l'IES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 5-6 (Feb.
2014).
9. The corporation's sacrifice is explained as a double-edged sword due to the poten
tial effects on discovery at the class certification stage. See infra Part I.C.
10. Investing in stock is not risk free. The risk analysis of stock investing is outside
the scope of this article. The point here is that if corporations are not burdened by heavy
litigation costs, presumably the corporation will be able to invest those savings in other
areas, which would hopefully add value to the company and ultimately increase the value
of the shareholder's stock. See infra Part I.C.
11. See infra Part II.B.i (identifying the corporate contract doctrine); Part II.C (identi
fying policy concerns related to federal preemption).
12. From 2006 to 2010, 40% of securities class action suits settled, 32% were dis
missed with prejudice, 11% were voluntarily dropped, leaving only 18% of cases moving
forward. Michael Klausner, Jason Hegland & Matthew Goforth, When Are Securities Class
Actions Dismissed, When Do They Settle, and For How Much? An Update, 26 PROF.
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windfall for plaintiffs' attorneys because the defendant corpora
tions pay the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees.13 Since the corporation is
the defendant, the shareholders are essentially draining capital
from the corporation they have invested in, which presents a cir
cular problem.
The Supreme Court created a modified reliance element for
l0b-5 securities class action suits deemed the "fraud-on-the
market" presumption in Basic Inc. v. Levinson. 14 However, in
2014, the Supreme Court allowed defendant corporations to rebut
this presumption at the class certification stage.15 The next issue
courts will have to face is determining the amount and type of ev
idence that will be required to rebut this presumption. While cer
tain factors and "event studies" have been proffered, it does not
require a large leap in logic to believe that courts will require
stronger and more substantial evidence to rebut the presump
tion.16 As a consequence, this will increase the cost for defendant
corporations to gather and prepare this rebuttal evidence, and the
excessive cost of litigation is already a major point of contention
regarding securities litigation.
By enforcing fee-shifting clauses for lOb-5 securities class ac
tion suits based on a fraud-on-the-market theory of reliance, the
playing field will be more balanced on both sides. It will deter
frivolous suits because plaintiffs will need stronger claims in or
der to survive the heightened presumption rebuttal from the de
fendant, or the plaintiffs will incur the defendant's litigation
costs. Due to heightened pleading requirements for l0b-5 claims,
the inability to be certified as a class can be viewed as bringing a
frivolous claim. This is because the evidence used to establish
class-wide reliance is also the foundation for succeeding on a lOb5 class action claim.17 Essentially, if the plaintiffs lack the evi
dence to win at trial, they should not attempt to bring a suit in
LIABILITY UNDERWRITING Soc'Y J. 1 fig. 1 (photo. reprint 2013) (2013), available at http:
//securities.stanford.edu/academic-articles/20130101-when-securities-class-actions-dismiss
ed-when-settle-for-how-much.pdf.
13. Daniel Fisher, Study Shows Consumer Class-Action Lawyers Earn Millions, Cli
ents Little, FORBES (Dec. 11, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2013/12/ll/
with-consumer-class-actions-lawyers-are-mostly-paid-to-do-nothing/.
14. 485 U.S. 224 (1988); see infra Part I.A.
15. See infra Part I.A.
16. See infra Part I.C.
17. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 247.
/
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hopes of settling before trial (before or during the class certifica
tion stage). At this point, should the case be dismissed, the corpo
ration should not be liable for paying the plaintiffs' attorneys'
fees. By shifting fees to the plaintiffs if they do not prevail (to a
certain extent), 18 plaintiffs will need to put their money where
their mouths are. On the other hand, with the increased discov
ery requirements, both parties and the court will be more aware
of the actual fraud and damage that took place, if any, which will
ultimately lead to a more definitive compensation figure for the
fraudulent acts.
Part I discusses the current landscape of securities class action
litigation. It explains how and why the suits are initiated and dis
cusses the outcome of Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc.
(Halliburton II). 19 Part II discusses the framework for the proposi
tion of this comment. It provides a brief history of significant cas
es and incorporates several recent cases that have opened the
door to the possibility of implementing fee-shifting clauses. It
concludes with a comparison to other contractual provisions cur
rently being implemented by corporations and also analyzes fee
shifting provisions under federal preemption. Part III explains
why implementing fee-shifting provisions solves many of the key
concerns raised by Halliburton II. Part IV discusses several im
plications and possible future actions that are readily recogniza
ble regarding fee-shifting provisions.

I.

CURRENT LANDSCAPE OF SHAREHOLDER SECURITIES
L ITIGATION

While plaintiffs can bring suits alleging various violations of
securities laws,2° the scope of this comment is focused on claims
alleging a l0b-5 violation. Further limiting the scope of this
comment, the proposed solution is aimed at affecting class action
securities claims in which the plaintiffs are attempting class cer
tification based on a "fraud-on-the-market" ("FOM") presumption
of reliance. The development of the fraud-on-the-market theory of
18. See infra Part III.
19. 573 U.S._, 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014); see infra Part I.
20. Such other claims deal with mergers and acquisitions, Chinese Reverse Mergers,
and violations of other sections of federal and state securities laws. See CORNERSTONE
RESEARCH, supra note 2, at 7 fig. 6 (listing numerous kinds of allegations).
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reliance and its effect on securities litigation are the subjects of
this part. It explains the current debate on the impact of the pre
sumption and concludes with an analysis of the recent Supreme
Court decision in Halliburton II.
A. Section 1 O(b) and Fraud-on-the-Market Presumption of
Reliance
The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 ("' 34 Act") created the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") to help enforce a
newly enacted regime of federal securities laws.21 Under the au
thority of section l0(b) of the '34 Act, the SEC issued Rule l0b-5
("l0b-5"), an anti-fraud provision that covered both the purchase
and sale of securities. 22 While there is no express private right of
action contained in the statutes or rules, the Supreme Court has
recognized an implied private right of action for lOb-5 violations
23
since 1946.
One of the elements that plaintiffs must prove in order to re
cover damages under lOb-5 claims is reliance,2 1 which is the most
relevant element to this comment. Essentially, plaintiffs must
prove that the defendant made a material misrepresentation or
omission on which the plaintiff relied in deciding to purchase or
sell securities. 25 Proof of reliance is fundamental to the court's
analysis because it "provides the requisite causal connection be
tween a defendant's misrepresentation and a plaintiffs injury."26
The Supreme Court, in Basic Inc. v. Levinson ("Basic"), recog
nized that requiring individual proof of direct reliance from every
21. Steven A. Ramirez, The Virtues of Private Securities Litigation: An Historic and
Macroeconomic Perspective, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 669, 681 (2014). A year prior to the en

actment of the '34 Act, the Securities Act of 1933 was enacted, requiring full disclosure of
initial securities distributions. Id. at 670, 680-81.
22. General Rules and Regulations, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 240 C.F.R. §
240.l0b-5 (2014); see Ramirez, supra note 21, at 681-82.
23. See Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946). In 2007,
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makar Issues & Rights, Ltd.,
began the opinion by stating, "This Court has long recognized that meritorious private ac
tions to enforce federal antifraud securities laws are an essential supplement to criminal
prosecutions and civil enforcement actions brought, respectively, by the Department of
Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission." 551 U.S. 308, 313 (2007).
24. Halliburton II, 573 U.S. at_, 134 S. Ct. at 2407 (citing Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret.
Plans & Trust Funds, 568 U.S._,_, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1191-92 (2013)).
25. Id.
26. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988).
/
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class plaintiff would run afoul of federal procedure for class certi
fication. 27 This prompted the Court to adopt the FOM presump
tion of reliance for class plaintiffs. 28 The presumption rests on the
rationale that a company's stock price that is traded on well
developed markets29 reflects all available public information in
cluding material misrepresentations. 30 Thus, it can be said that
the material misrepresentation has defrauded the market and an
investor's reliance may be presumed when he or she buys or sells
stock at the market price.31
In order for a plaintiff to assert the FOM presumption, a plain
tiff must show: "(1) that the alleged misrepresentations were pub
licly known, (2) that they were material, (3) that the stock traded
in an efficient market, and (4) that the plaintiff traded the stock
between the time the misrepresentations were made and when
the truth was revealed."32 The Court in Basic expressly held that
a defendant may rebut the presumption by showing that the mis
representation had no effect on the stock's price or the investor
would have bought or sold the stock despite knowledge of the
misrepresentation. 33 However, until a recent decision by the Su
preme Court in 2014, defendants attempting to rebut the pre
sumption could not offer such evidence until trial. 3·1 By allowing a
presumption of reliance, Basic ushered in an era of private secu
rities fraud litigation that grew so rapidly it required legislative
action. 35

27. Id. at 242. Class certification is not proper when individual questions of law or fact
predominate over questions of law or fact common to the class. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
28. Basic, 485 U.S. at 245-46.
29. Id. A common example would be the S&P 500. FOM incorporates the "efficient
market hypothesis," a topic that is outside the scope of this comment. It is worth noting
that whether markets are efficient or not is currently debated and further supported by
empirical data. See generally Bradford Cornell & James C. Rutten, Marllet Efficiency,
Crashes, and Securities Litigation, 81 TUL. L. REV. 443 (2006) (proposing a standard for
efficiency and weighing that standard against others).
30. Basic, 485 U.S. at 246-47.
31. Id.
32. Halliburton II, 573 U.S._,_, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2408 (2014).
33. Basic, 485 U.S. at 248.
34. Halliburton II, 573 U.S. at_, 13,1 S. Ct. at 2416.
35. See Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinhing Fraud on the Marhet, 2009
WIS. L. REV. 151, 152-53 ("'l'ens of billions of dollars have changed hands in settlements of
lOb-5 lawsuits in the last twenty years as a result of Basic.").
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B. Abuse and Settlement Dilemma
After the Supreme Court's decision in Basic, the number of
class action suits using the FOM presumption "rose dramatical
ly."36 This growth in alleged violations was not without problems.
A major concern was the "race to the courthouse" to file these
suits based on speculative bases.37 Furthermore, once a class was
certified or survived a motion to dismiss, the defendant corpora
tion typically settled well before trial due to the expected high
cost of litigation.38 An obvious reason for such swift settlement is
apparent-it is typically cheaper to settle such claims than to in
cur the high cost of litigation.39
Upon recognizing the potential for abuse, Congress enacted the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA")40 with
the intention of filtering out meritless claims by requiring higher
pleading standards.41 Unfortunately, the PSLRA, at least from an
empirical perspective, has not accomplished its goal. The U.S.
Chamber Institute for Legal Reform stated in a report on securi
ties class actions that "[s]ince enactment of the PSLRA, 4,226
federal securities class actions have been filed ... and over 40% of
corporations listed on major U.S. stock exchanges have been tar
geted by a securities class action law suit." 42 The report further
stated that only fourteen of those resulted in trial verdicts, while
the others were settled or dismissed.43 In 1998, Congress made a
second attempt at reforming securities litigation by enacting the
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (" SLU SA").44
36. Id. at 153; see also Jill E. Fisch, The Trouble with Basic: Price Distortion After
Halliburton, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 895, 896 (2013).
37. Richard M. Phillips & Gilbert C. Miller, The Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995: Rebalancing Litigation Risks and Rewards for Class Action Plaintiffs, Defend
ants and Lawyers, 51 Bus. LAW. 1009, 1011-12 (1996) [hereinafter Rebalancing Litigation
Risks].
38. See id. at 1012.
39. Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act World, 2003 U.
ILL. L. REV. 913, 921.
40. Id. at 914; see Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109
Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
41. Perino, supra note 39, at 914.
42. U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 8, at 5.
43. Id.
44. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112
Stat. 3227 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Cecilia A. Glass, Sword or
Shield? Setting Limits on SLUSA's Ever-Growing Reach, 63 DUim L.J. 1337, 1338 (201,�.
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The purpose of this act was to prevent circumvention of the re
cently created PSLRA by requiring plaintiffs alleging l0b-5
claims to file in federal court.'15 But as the data above shows, l0b5 claims are still being filed, and more importantly, settling be
fore trial.·16
While the potential for abuse and the settlement dilemma are
still apparent in modern litigation, defendant corporations were
recently given a significant helping hand in rebutting the FOM
presumption. However, the use of this helping hand is likely to
come at a significant cost for the corporation.
C. The Supreme Court Upholds FOM, but Provides Uncertain
Modification
In 2014, the Supreme Court decided Halliburton II, holding
that defendants are allowed to offer proof against the FOM pre
sumption at class certification. 47 The Court was tasked with de
ciding whether to overturn or modify Basic. 48 Erica P. John Fund,
Inc. ("EPJ") alleged that Halliburton Co. ("Halliburton") made a
series of misrepresentations regarding the company's future deal
ings in an effort to inflate the company's stock price.·19 EPJ assert
ed that, in response to Halliburton's subsequent corrective disclo
sures, the company's stock price dropped, thus causing harm to
its shareholders.50 EPJ then invoked the Basic presumption and
moved to be certified as a class comprised of all of the investors
who purchased stock during the period of inflation.51 The case
made it to the Supreme Court twice. The first time around, the
Supreme Court held that class action plaintiffs alleging securities
fraud need not prove loss causation at the class certification stage
in order to invoke Basie's presumption. 52 On remand, Halliburton
45. 15 U.S.C. § 77p (2012); see Halliburton II, 573 U.S. _, _, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2426
(2014).
46. U.S. CHAMilER INS'l'. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 8, at 5.
47. 573 U.S. at_, 134 S. Ct. at 2417. "Basie's presumption" and the "FOM presump
tion" are interchangeable terms.
48. Class Actions-Presumption of Reliance Under SEC Rule 1 0b-5-Halliburton Co.
v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 128 HARV. L. REV. 291, 291 (2014).
49. Halliburton II, 573 U.S. at_, 134 S. Ct. at 2405.
50. Id. at_, 134 S. Ct. at 2405-06.
51. Id. at_, 134 S. Ct. at 2406.
52. Id. at_, 134 S. Ct. at 2406-07.
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argued that the evidence it previously introduced to disprove loss
causation also disproved that the misrepresentations had an im
pact on the stock price. 5:1 Halliburton contended that without any
price impact, the investors would have to prove individual reli
ance on the misrepresentations and thus class certification was
improper under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCP")
Rule 23(b)(3). 51 By not considering Halliburton's argument, the
district court certified the class, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed,
stating that while Halliburton's price impact evidence could be
used at trial to rebut the presumption, it could not be used at
class certification.55 Thus, the case appeared before the Supreme
Court for the second time-this time to address whether price
impact evidence could be introduced at the class certification
stage to rebut Basie's FOM presumption. 56
The Supreme Court ultimately decided not to overturn Basic, 57
but the Court did find that it was proper for defendants to intro
duce "price impact" evidence at the class certification stage to re
58
but Basie's FOM presumption. The Court distinguished its deci
sion from another recent case in which the Court held that
securities class action plaintiffs do not need to prove materiality
at class certification. 59 The Court found "price impact" fundamen
tal to Basie's presumption since the presumption assumes that in
efficient markets a stock's price reflects all public information, in
cluding misrepresentations. 60 "Price impact" necessarily affects
class certification under Rule 23(b)(3) because "if reliance is to be
shown through the Basic presumption, the publicity and market
efficiency prerequisites must be proved before class certification.
53. Id. at_, 134 S. Ct. at 2406.
54. Id.
55. Id. at_, 134 8. Ct. at 2406-07.
56. Id. at_, 134 8. Ct. at 2407. The Court also accepted the case to reconsider Basie's
presumption itself. Id.
57. Id. Halliburton contended that Basic should be overruled on several grounds. Spe
cifically, Halliburton argued that Basie's presumption: (1) conflicted with Congress's in
tent in enacting the '34 Act; (2) relied on the markets being efficient which had been em
pirically disproven; (3) eliminated the reliance element for lOb-5 claims and altered the
burden of proof under Rule 23 class certification; and (4) implicated policy concerns re
garding the amount of meritless claims, costs on shareholders, and unnecessary use of ju
dicial resources. Id. at_, 134 8. Ct. at 2408--13.
58. Id. at_, 134 8. Ct. at 2417.
59. Id. at _, 134 S. Ct. at 2416-17; see Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust
Funds, 568 U.S._,_, 133 8. Ct. 1184, 1202 (2013).
60. Halliburton II, 573 U.S. at_, 134 S. Ct. at 2416.

I
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Without proof of those prerequisites, the fraud-on-the-market
theory underlying the presumption completely collapses, render
ing class certification inappropriate."61 So now defendants may in
troduce either direct or indirect evidence showing lack of price
impact at class certification. 62 Indirect evidence would tend to
show that the misrepresentation was publicly known or that the
market was inefficient, as opposed to direct evidence such as re
ports showing the stock price did not change between the time
when the misrepresentation was made and the time period after
corrective statements were made.63
At the time of this writing, the effects of Halliburton II have
not fully come to light, but plenty of scholars and lawyers have of
fered commentary on the Court's decision, revealing a mixed view
of the results. Some say the decision was a win for plaintiffs,
while others believe the opposite, and still others even say the de
cision will not have any effect. 61 The remainder of this section
deals with the implications regarding the decision in Halliburton
II. These implications set forth the problem this comment seeks
to resolve.
Some commentators believe that if Halliburton II appears to
make plaintiffs' case an uphill battle, plaintiffs' lawyers will
simply find other avenues to bring such claims. 65 One such ave
nue would be to assert the misrepresentations as omissions to in
voke the presumption of reliance from Affiliated Ute Citizens of
Utah v. United States66 Depending on the facts of the case, other
61. Id.
62. Id. at_, 134 S. Ct. at 2417.
63. Id. at_, 134 S. Ct. at 2415-16.
64. See e.g., Alison Frankel, SCOTUS Halliburton Ruling Could Baell/ire for Securi
ties Defendants, REUTERS (June 23, 2014), available at http://blogs.reuters.com/alison
franke1/2014/06/23/scotus•halliburton·ruling-could•backfire•for-securities•defendants/ (dis•
cussing the benefits and burdens for both plaintiffs and defendants); Douglas W. Greene,
First Take on Halliburton II: The Price-Impact Rule May Not Have Much Practical Impact,
D&O DISCOURSE (June 24, 2014), http://www.dandodiscourse.com/2014/06/24/first-take-on
•halliburton•ii•the-price-impact-rule-may-not-have-much•practical·impact/.
65. Greene, supra note 64.
66. Id. The presumption of reliance for omissions created under Affiliated Ute Citizens
of Utah v. United States may be invoked only if there is proof of fraudulent course of busi
ness in violation of 10b-(5)(a) or (c). But the omissions must have made affirmative state
ments false or misleading. Claire Loebs Davis, Halliburton: Is the Fix as Basic as Alleging
Omissions Under Affiliated Ute? Or Is That Too Cute?, D&O DISCOURSE (,Jan. 28, 2014),
http://www.dandodiscourse.com/2014/01/28/halliburton-is-the-fix-as-basic-as-alleging-omis
sions-under-affiliated-ute-or-is-that-too-cute/; see Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United
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such avenues could be to allege violations of sections 11 or 12 of
the '34 Act. 67 The takeaway from these commentators is that Hal
liburton II did not signal the end of securities class actions.

Halliburton II fixed one of the problems with Basie's presump
tion. The Court in Basic expressly stated that the presumption of
reliance was rebuttable. 68 Nevertheless, many commentators, and
even several Justices, reason that the presumption was irrebut
table in practice. 69 According to an amicus brief filed in Hallibur
ton II, defendants in FOM cases rarely attempted to rebut, and
even when they were successful, the outcome only removed a few
members from the class. 70 After Halliburton II, defendants have a
stronger incentive to rebut the presumption at the class certifica
tion stage. The issue now becomes a question of what amount or
type of "price impact" evidence will be sufficient to rebut Basie's
presumption. The Supreme Court acknowledged use of "event
studies," which include regression analysis, that look at price im
pact for each individual misrepresentation since plaintiffs typical
ly use such evidence to show the existence of price impact. 71 Now
defendants are able to strip away the presumption regarding any
misrepresentations they can prove had no impact on the stock's
price. 72 This renders certification inappropriate under Rule
23(b)(3) as to the specific misrepresentation because plaintiffs
would be required to prove actual reliance. 73 The use of event
studies, some commentators believe, will turn into a "battle of the

States, 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972).
67. N.Y. CITY BAR ASS'N COMM. ON SEC. LITIG., REPORT ON THE PossrnLg IMPACT OF
HALLIBURTON II ON SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 80 (May 28, 2014).
68. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 249-50 (1988).
69. See, e.g., Halliburton II, 573 U.S._,_, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2424 (Thomas, J., concur
ring); Brief for Former SEC Commissioners and Officials and Law Professors as Amici Cu
riae Supporting Petitioners at 24, Halliburton II, 573 U.S._, 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014) (No.
13-317) [hereinafter Brief for Former SEC Commissioners and Officials and Law Profes
sors].
70. Brief for Former SEC Commissioners and Officials and Law Professors, supra
note 69, at 22-26 (comparing the attempt of rebuttal to a game of Whack-a-Mole).
71. Halliburton II, 573 U.S. at_, 134 S. Ct. at 2415. If the study lacked a showing of
price impact regarding the specific misrepresentation at issue, the presumption has no
foundation to rest upon, even if the plaintiffs "event study" showed that the market was
efficient. See id.
72. Aaron M. Streett & Shane Pennington, Basic Instinct: The Supreme Court Con
fronts the Fraud-on-the-Mar/wt Theory, 46 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) at 1883, 1886 (Sept.
29, 2014).
73. Id..
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experts."71 Both parties will presumably introduce event studies
as direct evidence of price impact or the lack thereof. A problem
arises when experts come to different conclusions because there
are numerous statistical tools and models that can be used to
produce event studies. 75 This will lead to Daubert challenges re
garding expert methodologies.76
One thing seems certain regarding the use of event studies
the cost of bringing and defending a securities class action claim
will increase. In regards to the price impact ruling of Halliburton
II, Roberta Karmel stated, "It is unlikely this will make lOb-5
cases less expensive, and may even prove inimical to the defeat of
class actions, since it may allow plaintiffs additional discovery in
class certification battles."77 Other attorneys predict that plain
tiffs will incur higher costs to get past class certification, and the
costs of defending such cases will certainly increase.78 The effects
of an increase in upfront costs seem to only favor plaintiffs. If
plaintiffs defeat price impact defenses at the class certification
stage, they are in a far more favorable position in post
certification settlement negotiations. 79 Furthermore, once defend
ants oppose class certification based on price impact, plaintiffs
most certainly will make discovery demands on the basis of those
defenses. 80 Again, this will potentially make the plaintiffs' cases
stronger, or strengthen their settlement position, depending on
what information is handed over. 81 So even though defendants are
now able to rebut Basie's presumption at the class certification

74. Id.
75. Mark A. Perry & Jonathan C. Dickey, Eight Propositions Regarding the Scope of
Halliburton II, 46 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) at 1403, 1406 (July 21, 2014).
76. Id. Daubert challenges require courts to determine the reliability and relevance of
expert testimony. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594-95 (1993).
For an in-depth analysis of Daubert challenges pertaining to financial experts, see
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPER, D,1UBER1' CHALLENGES TO FINANCIAL EXPERTS: A YEARLY
STUDY OF TRENDS AND OUTCOMES 1 (Apr. 2014), http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/forensic
services/publications/assets/daubert-study-2013.pdf.
77. Roberta S. Karmel, Attached Again, Basic Survives, 46 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA)
at 1347, 1350 (July 14, 2014); see also M. Todd Henderson & Adam C. Pritchard, Hallibur
ton Will Raise Cost of Securities Class Actions, LAW360 (July 2, 2014), https://www.law
360.com/articles/552839/ halliburton-will-raise-cost-of-securities-class-actions.
78. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 64.
79. Frankel, supra note 64.
80.

81.

Id.
See id.
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stage, the possible economic consequences of such defenses will
factor into a defendant's decision to fight the claim or settle.
The last issue of this section is the problem of circularity in
shareholder class action suits. The problem does not stem from
Halliburton II, but rather from the nature of shareholder class
action suits. The problem of circularity increases the costs of liti
gation implicated by Halliburton II and further exacerbates the
expense problem. Circularity arises because in shareholder class
action suits, the issuer of the stock (i.e., the defendant corpora
tion) pays the damages, either directly or through directors and
officers ("D&O") insurance.82 The consequence is that the share
holders themselves are the ones who ultimately bear the cost of
such payments. 83 The problem gets more intricate when the
shareholder class differs from current shareholders.81 Additional
ly, since most cases settle, the damages paid are simply a transfer
of wealth between investors, with attorneys getting a significant
cut.85 This again leads back to the "race to the courthouse" issue
discussed above, since plaintiffs' attorneys are motivated to get
their share of the action as early and often as possible.8'; Empiri
cal analysis tends to show that shareholder wealth is actually de
stroyed due to class action litigation.87 Most importantly in this
context, after Halliburton II, the costs of litigation are going to
increase without providing any meaningful benefit to sharehold
ers because shareholders ultimately bear the costs. As to this im
plication, M. Todd Henderson succinctly states, "Securities class
actions are a costly form of insurance against fraud, and investors
are the ones ultimately footing the bill. Only the lawyers, and
88
now, the economists, are enriched."
The FOM presumption provides for class-wide reliance and
promotes private enforcement against securities fraud. Since the
82. Jill E. Fisch, Confronting the Circularity Problem in Private Securities Litigation,
2009 WIS. L. REV. 333, 337.
83. Id. For a brief explanation of the effects on shareholders, see U.S. Ci!AMDER INST.
FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 8, at 5-6.
84. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deter
rence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1556-62 (2006).
85. U.S. CHAMDER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 8, at 5-6.
86. See id. at 5. A more detailed analysis of the circularity problem is outside the
scope of this comment.
87. See id. at 6.
88. Henderson & Pritchard, supra note 77.
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presumption's creation in Basic, securities class action litigation
has been voluminous. 89 Several negative effects of the presump
tion eventually required legislative action and judicial modifica
tion. In Halliburton II, the Supreme Court denied overturning
Basic but did make a modification that would presumably help
defendants. 90 However, the implications of rebutting the pre
sumption at class certification may in fact leave such litigation
with the same problems, or make them worse. With Basic here to
stay, corporations should seek better ways to protect themselves
from such litigation, which in turn will ultimately protect share
holder wealth.
IL FEE-SHIFTING PROVISIONS TAKE THE SPOTLIGHT

This section looks at the contractual relationship between cor
porations and shareholders under the corporation's articles of in
corporation and bylaws. Specifically, it focuses on fee-shifting
provisions, which transfer litigation and attorneys fees from a
corporate defendant to shareholder plaintiffs under certain cir
cumstances. First, this section will discuss the recent Delaware
91
Supreme Court case, ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund,
which has sparked a debate on the implementation of fee-shifting
provisions that attempt to govern litigation. This section then
compares fee-shifting provisions with other contractual provisions
affecting litigation currently being used by corporations. The sec
tion concludes with the necessary analysis of federal preemption,
as this comment proposes to apply private contractual agree
ments to federal lOb-5 claims.
A. ATP Tour, Inc.
ATP Tour, Inc. ("ATP") is a membership corporation, incorpo
rated in Delaware, that operates a men's professional tennis
tour. 92 In 2006, ATP's board of directors amended the bylaws by
adopting a provision that held members liable for the corpora89. Langevoort, supra note 35, at 153.
90. See Henderson & Pritchard, supra note 77.
91. 91 A.3d 554 (Del. 2014).
92. Id. at 555. A membership corporation is another term for a closely held corpora
tion or "non-stock" corporation.
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tion's "litigation costs" in any claim brought by the members
against the corporation if the members lost at trial. 93 In 2007, the
board of directors changed the tour format, and several members
brought suit against ATP and other members in federal court, al
leging federal antitrust claims and Delaware fiduciary duty
claims. 91 The district court held in favor of the defendants on all
claims, at which point ATP moved to implement its fee-shifting
bylaw under Rule 54 of the FRCP. 95 The district court denied
ATP's motion, stating that federal law preempts contractual
agreements when dealing with antitrust claims. 96 On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decided that
the bylaw needed to be found enforceable under Delaware law be
fore any issues of preemption could be determined.97 On remand,
the district court found that the bylaw's enforceability should be
answered by the Delaware Supreme Court and certified four
questions of law. 98 The Delaware Supreme Court found the fee
shifting bylaw facially valid, but the holding was limited to non
stock Delaware corporations.99 The Delaware Supreme Court fur
ther stated that "[w]hether the specific ATP fee-shifting bylaw is
enforceable, however, depends on the manner in which it was

93. Id. at 556. The amended bylaw reads as follows:
(a) In the event that (i) any [current or prior member or Owner or anyone on
their behalf ("Claiming Party")] initiates or asserts any [claim or counter
claim ("Claim")] or joins, offers substantial assistance to or has a direct finan
cial interest in any Claim against the League or any member or Owner (in
cluding any Claim purportedly filed on behalf of the League or any member),
and (ii) the Claiming Party (or the third party that received substan
tial assistance from the Claiming Party or in whose Claim the Claiming Par
ty had a direct financial interest) does not obtain a judgment on the merits
that substantially achieves, in substance and amount, the full remedy
sought, then each Claiming Party shall be obligated jointly and severally to
reimburse the League and any such member or Owners for all fees, costs and
expenses of every kind and description (including, but not limited to, all rea
sonable attorneys' fees and other litigation expenses) (collectively, "Litigation
Costs") that the parties may incur in connection with such Claim.
Id.
94. Id. at 556.
95. Id.; see FED. R. CIV. P. 54.
96. ATP Tour, 91 A.3d at 556.
97. Id. at 556-57.
98. Id. at 557.
/
99. Id. at 555, 558.
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adopted and the circumstances under which it was invoked. By
laws that may otherwise be facially valid will not be enforced if
100
adopted or used for an inequitable purpose."
Immediately after this decision, the Delaware legislature,
urged on by the state plaintiffs' bar, 101 attempted to pass a law
expressly prohibiting fee-shifting provisions in a stock corpora
tion's articles or bylaws. 102 However, in response to protests and
requests from business groups and corporations, the legislature
tabled the bill to further study the matter. w:i Currently, the Dela
ware legislature has not enacted any laws regarding fee
shifting.10·1 Any future action will presumably have an effect on
the analysis and arguments of this comment. While the holding
in ATP Tour is clearly limited to Delaware non-stock corpora
tions, the remainder of this section discusses the holding's possi
ble application to stock corporations.105
The primary purpose of fee-shifting provisions is to impose a
"loser pays" rule106 different from the American Rule followed by
Delaware courts, which typically requires parties to pay their
own litigation costs.107 After the holding in ATP Tour, multiple
Delaware corporations adopted such fee-shifting bylaws, and oth
er companies have included fee-shifting provisions in their arti100. Id. at 558.
101. Stephen Bainbridge,Delaware's Decision: Viewing Fee Shifting Bylaws Through a
Public Choice Lens, PROFESSORBAINilRIDGE.COM (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.professor
bainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2014/11/delawares-decision-viewing-fee-shifting.
bylaws-through-a-public-choice-lens.html [hereinafter Bainbridge,Public Choice Lens].
102. Rickard, supra note 1.
103. Id.
104. At the time of this writing, the Delaware legislature had tabled the discussion of
fee-shifting clauses. See Jonathan Starkey, Fee-Shifting Bylaw Bill Tabled Until 2015,
DELAWAREONLINE (June 19, 2014), http://www.delawareonline.com/story/money/business
/2014/06/19/delaware-general-assembly-tables-legal-fee-shifting-bylaw-bill/ 10946611/.
105. For purposes of this comment, further use of the term "corporation" refers to
"stock corporations." This comment specifically identifies any discussion of "non-stock cor
porations."
106. Stephen Bainbridge, The Case for Allowing Fee Shifting Bylaws as a Privately Or
dered Solution to the Shareholder Litigation Epidemic, PIWFl•;ssoRBAINBRIDGE.COM (Nov.
17, 2014), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2014/11/the-case
for-allowing-fee-shifting-bylaws-as-a-privately-ordered-solution-to-the-shareholder-litigat.
html [hereinafter Bainbridge,Privately Ordered Solution].
107. ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 558 (Del. 2014). Fee
shifting closely resembles the English Rule, which requires the losing party to cover the
winning party's litigation costs. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The English

Versus the American Rule on Attorney Fees: An Empirical Study of Public Company Con
tracts, 98 CORNELLL. REV. 327,329 (2013).
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cles as they prepare for initial public offerings ("IPOs"). 108 There
are similarities between the motives for adopting fee-shifting
provisions and the arguments that ultimately led the Supreme
Court to modify Basie's presumption. Before comparing the rela
tionship and analyzing how fee-shifting can help solve some of
the implications from Halliburton II, it would be helpful to lay a
foundation for the application of fee-shifting provisions.

B. Building a Foundation for a Strategic Defense
The purpose of this section is to compare fee-shifting provisions
with corporate contract provisions that affect litigation between a
corporation and its shareholders. Corporate bylaws and articles
are generally viewed as contractual relationships between the
corporation and its shareholders. 109 As such, state corporation
laws, specifically those in Delaware, generally allow broad discre
tion on how corporations choose to operate. uo The two corporate
contract provisions discussed below are forum-selection clauses
and arbitration clauses. These provisions help lay a foundation
for fee-shifting provisions because of their method of adoption,
the reasons behind their adoption, and their enforceability in cas
es brought in federal court. This section concludes with a federal
preemption analysis, which naturally flows from the comparison
of the other corporate contract provisions.
1. Relationship to Forum-Selection Clauses
Forum-selection clauses in a corporation's articles or bylaws
require claims against the corporation to be brought in specific
states and courts. Initially, such forum-selection provisions were
not necessary since the internal affairs doctrine applied to corpo108. John C. Coffee, Jr., Fee Shifting Bylaw and Charter Provisions: Can They Apply in
Federal Court?-The Case for Preemption 1 (Columbia Law Sch. Ctr. for Law and Econ.
Studies, Working Paper No. 498, 2014) [hereinafter Coffee, The Case for Preemption],
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?Abstract_id=2508973. The difference

between a bylaw adopted by the board of directors and a provision contained in a corpora
tion's articles will be discussed in Part Il.B to provide context.
109. See ATP Tour, 91 A.3d at 558.
110. Donald F. Parsons, Jr. & Joseph R. Slights III, The History of Delaware's Business
Courts: Their Rise to Preeminence, 17 Bus. L. TODAY 21, 23 (Mar.-Apr. 2008). The reason
for pointing out Delaware is because the majority of Fortune 500 corporations choose to
incorporate in the state. Id. at 22.

/
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rations.111 The internal affairs doctrine states that the laws of the
state of incorporation are to apply when a corporation is sued. 112
Before 2002, the doctrine was also thought to provide exclusive
jurisdiction to courts in the state of incorporation.113 In response
to a drastic increase in challenges to merger transactions, which
were being filed outside the state of incorporation and often in
multiple jurisdictions, corporations adopted forum-selection
clauses providing for exclusive jurisdiction in the state of incorpo
ration, this typically being Delaware.114 In 2010, the Delaware
Chancery Court endorsed forum-selection clauses contained with
in a corporation's articles. 115 Such clauses were challenged in Del
aware courts, but were ultimately upheld.116 The Supreme Court
of the United States confronted forum-selection clauses in Atlan
tic Marine Construction Co. v. U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Texas. 111 The Court stated that "a proper application of
[28 U.S.C.] § 1404(a) requires that a forum-selection clause be
'given controlling weight in all but the most exceptional cases."'118
In Atlantic Marine, the Court also laid out the framework for fed
eral courts to use in analyzing forum-selection disputes.119
Delaware courts take the view that articles of incorporation
and bylaws are contracts between the corporation and current
and future shareholders. 120 However, while both are viewed as
contracts, their methods of alteration differ. Companies adopt ar
ticles of incorporation at the time of incorporation, and amend
ments can be made by action of the board of directors and subse-

111. Verity Winship, Shareholder Litigation by Contract 15 (Mar. 6, 2015) (un
published manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2575668.
112. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS§ 302 cmt. g (1971).
113. Winship, supra note 111, at 15-16.
114. Id. at 16.
115. In re Revlon, Inc. S'holders' Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 & n.8 (Del. Ch. 2010).
116. See Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 956-57 (Del.
Ch. 2013) (holding that forum-selection clauses unilaterally adopted by the board of direc
tors were facially valid); City of Providence v. First Citizens Bancshares, Inc., 99 A.3d 229,
242 (Del. Ch. 2014) (holding that a Delaware corporation can choose a forum other than
Delaware in a forum-selection clause).
117. 571 U.S._, _, 134 S. Ct. 568, 575 (2013).
118. Id. at_, 134 S. Ct. at 579 (quoting Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22,
33 (1988)) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
119. Id. at_, 134 S. Ct. at 575.
120. Winship, supra note 111, at 12.
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quent approval by a majority of the shareholders.121 In contrast,
the board of directors or shareholders can adopt, amend, or repeal
bylaws unilaterally.122 Despite this unilateral nature of bylaws,
Delaware courts treat them as contracts because shareholders
agree to governance by the board of directors when they invest in
123
the corporation.
Thus, courts analyzing the facial validity of forum-selection
clauses differ depending on whether they are contained in the ar
ticles or bylaws. Typically clauses contained in the articles are fa
cially valid since shareholder approval is required, 12·1 or in the
case of adoption prior to the IPO, shareholders simply do not have
to invest in that company.125 As for the facial validity of clauses
contained in bylaws, Delaware corporate law provides broad lan
guage on what bylaws may control, including the internal affairs
of the corporation.126 Under Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement
Fund u. Chevron Corp., forum-selection bylaws govern the "inter
nal affairs" of the corporation and thus are facially valid.127 Addi
tionally, the Delaware Chancery Court recognized that Delaware
and federal law "respect□ and enforce[] forum-selection claus
128
es." In determining the enforceability of bylaws, courts look at
the text, purpose, and adoption of the bylaw to make sure it was
not adopted for an improper purpose.129
The relationship between· forum-selection clauses and fee
shifting clauses rests on the motive, method of adoption, and the
121. Id. at 11.
122. Id.
123. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 958 (Del. Ch.
2013).
124. Winship, supra note 111 at 10, 28-30.
125. The SEC's registration requirements include disclosure of certain charter provi
sions. See Coffee, The Case for Preemption supra note 108, at 8-9. Companies are incen
tivized to disclose forum selection clauses because it will provide greater enforceability in
court. See Paul Scrivano & Noah Kornblith, Exclusive Foriun Bylaws: Further Considera
tion Recommended, O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP (Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.omm.com/ex
elusive-forum·bylaws-further-consideration.recommended-03-11-2014/.
126. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2015) ("The bylaws may contain any provision, not
inconsistent with law or with the certificate of incorporation, relating to the business of
the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or powers
of its stockholders, directors, officers or employees.").
127. Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 939.
128. Id.
129. See Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971); Winship,
/
supra note 111, at 30.
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contractual relationship between shareholders and the corpora
tion. The purpose of forum-selection clauses is to consolidate mul
ti-jurisdictional claims, which consequently lowers the net cost of
such litigation.130 The motive behind fee-shifting clauses, while
slightly different, has the same net effect of lowering litigation
costs for corporate defendants.131 Fee-shifting clauses have and
will be adopted in the same manner as forum-selection clauses;
this is why the Delaware Supreme Court in ATP Tour held that
the fee-shifting provisions were facially valid.132 Fee-shifting
clauses, which seek to allocate "risk among parties in intra
corporate litigation" govern the internal affairs of the corpora
tion.133 Forum-selection clauses simply affect the procedure of liti
gation, and in no way affect the rights of shareholders to file
claims against the corporation. However, under the theory that
bylaws are contracts, should this allow corporations to essentially
limit a shareholder's ability to file claims?
2. Relationship to Arbitration Clauses
Arbitration clauses can be seen as a cousin to forum-selection
clauses since such clauses require parties to resolve problems
outside of the public court system.131 One important distinction
regarding arbitration clauses is the legislative support of the
135
Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), which favors arbitration. Sev
eral decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States have
limited the ability of courts to invalidate such clauses. In AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Supreme Court stated, "The
'principal purpose' of the FAA is to 'ensur[e] that private arbitra
tion agreements are enforced according to their terms."'136 In
American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, the Court held
that, under the FAA, a court cannot invalidate a contractual
130. Winship, supra note 111, at 16.
131. Id. at 52-53.
132. See ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 559-60 (Del. 2014).
133. ATP Tour, 91 A.3d at 558.
134. See Winship, supra note 111, at 19. Compare this to forum selection clauses,
which also "oust0" the otherwise default court from jurisdiction. Id. at 13.
135. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1925) ("A written provision in .. . a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration ... shall be valid, ir
revocable, and enforceable.").
136. 563 U.S._,_, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) (quoting Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Trs.,
489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989)).
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waiver of class arbitration, because "the fact that it is not worth
the expense involved in proving a statutory remedy does not con
stitute the elimination of the right to pursue that remedy." 137 In
discussing a conflict between the arbitration clause and federal
antitrust laws, the Court held that antitrust laws did not guaran
tee an "affordable" procedure to vindicate claims. 138 In fact, arbi
tration clauses can be enforced for claims alleging violations of
federal securities laws. 139 While the FAA explicitly supports arbi
tration clauses, Verity Winship points out that these cases "can
be understood as part of a movement towards a permissive atti
tude to private ordering of procedure."140
In applying the Court's analysis of arbitration clauses to fee
shifting clauses, we can establish an indirect relationship. While
the FAA supports arbitration clauses, the PSLRA indirectly sup
ports fee-shifting clauses. 141 The purpose of Congress enacting the
PSLRA was to cure abusive practices plaguing securities class ac
tions.112 The PSLRA imposes sanctions for frivolous litigation by
including a presumption in favor of awarding attorneys' fees for
violations of FRCP Rule 11. 1·13 Before the PSLRA, such awards
were entirely at the court's discretion.144 Now the courts are re
quired to make a finding regarding compliance with FRCP Rule
11; if the court finds non-compliance, mandatory sanctions are to
be imposed. 145 By making these sanctions mandatory with a pre
sumption of attorneys' fees and costs, Congress has essentially
enacted legislation supporting fee-shifting. Analyzing a fee
shifting clause under Italian Colors, fee-shifting clauses adopted
either in a corporation's articles or bylaws are contracts. 146 Fur
thermore, fee-shifting clauses do not eliminate a shareholder's
137. 570 U.S._,_, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 (2013).
138. Id. at 2309.
139. Cf. Goldberg v. Bear, Sterns & Co., 912 F.2d 1418, 1420 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curi
am) (affirming the lower court's decision that federal securities claims were not included
in the parties' arbitration agreement, implying that, had they been, the securities claims
would have been subject to arbitration as well).
140. Winship, supra note 111, at 14.
141. Goldberg, 912 F.2d at 1420; Rebalancing Litigation Rishs, supra note 37, at 1009.
142. Rebalancing Litigation Rishs, supra note 37, at 1009-13.
143. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(c) (2012).
144. See Rebalancing Litigation Rishs, supra note 37, at 1016.
145. Id.
146. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S._,_, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311
(2013).
/
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right to pursue l0b-5 claims even though pursuit might prove
costly to the plaintiffs. 147 Thus, fee-shifting clauses can be viewed
as a contractual enforcement of these mandatory sanctions when
plaintiffs fail to be certified as a class due to lack of price impact.
By failing to prove-or through a defendants' sufficient rebuttal
of-price impact, we can deduce that the plaintiffs have violated
FRCP Rule ll(b) since plaintiffs' "claims, defenses, [or] other le
148
gal contentions" are not "warranted by existing law."
By limiting fee-shifting clauses to l0b-5 class actions, we are
able to find legislative support under the PSLRA's mandatory
sanctions. Further, just like arbitration clauses, fee-shifting
clauses do not eliminate a plaintiffs right to bring lOb-5 claims.
Thus, fee-shifting clauses appear to fall in line with judicial anal
ysis of arbitration clauses. By looking at the validity and en
forcement of forum-selection and arbitration clauses, it is appar
ent that courts are willing to allow private contractual changes to
be made to litigation procedure.

C. Issue with Federal Preemption
One potential problem with fee-shifting clauses as they relate
to l0b-5 claims is that federal courts may find that federal securi
ties laws preempt enforcement of the clauses. In fact, the district
court in ATP Tour made such a statement. 149 This section looks at
the possible preemption issue from both sides. 150 Some commenta
tors believe there is a strong argument for preemption in securi
ties class actions due to Congressional enactments and the
FRCP. 101 However, with proper constraints on fee-shifting clauses,
there is the potential to side-step preemption and fall in line with
the policy goals underlying such actions taken by Congress. Fur
thermore, a case can be made that limited fee-shifting clauses do
147. Rebalancing Litigation Risks, supra note 37, at 1032.
148. FED. R. CIV. P. ll(b)(2). Plaintiffs and plaintiffs attorneys are aware of the height
ened pleading standards required in the PLSRA and that bringing a claim that is insuffi
cient to pass, or is easily rebutted at, the class certification stage can be viewed as bring
ing a speculative claim. Rebalancing Litigation Rislw, supra note 37, at 1039. As with
speculative claims, plaintiffs presume that the defendants are more likely to settle rather
than attempt to defend the allegations. See id. at 1015.
149. ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 556 (Del. 2014).
150. A decision on the enforceability of the fee-shifting bylaw in ATP Tour has not yet
been handed down. Id. at 560.
151. See, e.g., Rebalancing Litigation Rishs, supra note 37, at 1047.
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in fact comply with the PSLRA and FRCP, in the same fashion as
forum-selection and arbitration clauses.
John C. Coffee, Jr., a prominent scholar on corporate law mat
ters, suggests that there is a strong case for preemption in securi
ties litigation.152 His analysis starts by looking at precedent that
shows federal courts' resistance to enforcing state law penalties
aimed at deterring frivolous litigation.153 In Burlington Northern
Railroad Co. v. Woods, the defendant moved to have the tort ac
tion removed from state court to federal court, where the defend
ant lost and subsequently appealed.154 The court of appeals af
firmed the district court's decision and also granted the plaintiffs'
motion to enforce an Alabama statute imposing a mandatory 10%
penalty for frivolous appeals.155 The Supreme Court of the United
States refused to enforce the Alabama state statute based on its
decision in Hanna v. Plumer, stating that Federal Rules of Appel
late Procedure already provide courts with the discretionary pow
er to impose a penalty for frivolous appeals. 156 Furthermore, the
Court highlighted the conflict between state law and federal
rules, primarily being that the state law was mandatory and the
federal rules were discretionary.157 Coffee states that this same
conflict arises between mandatory fee-shifting bylaws and discre
tionary penalties for violations of FRCP Rule ll(b) under the
PSLRA. 158
However, Coffee also notes that other federal cases have ap
plied state law requirements that have the same effect as fee
shifting bylaws. 159 In Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,
the Supreme Court upheld a New Jersey law requiring share
holder plaintiffs to post a security bond for the payment of the de
fendant's reasonable litigation expenses should the plaintiff be
152. Coffee, The Case for Preemption, supra note 108, at 8.
153. Id. at 3.
154. 480 U.S. 1, 2 (1987).
155. Id. at 2-3. The 10% penalty is calculated as 10% of the judgment. Id. at 3.
156. Id. at 6-8.
157. Id. at 8.
158. Coffee, The Case for Preemption, supra note 108, at 4; see FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (allow
ing discretionary sanction for violations of Rule ll(b)). Coffee uses the term "discretion�ry"
because it is the court's prerogative to issue sanctions based on the court's analysis of
whether FRCP Rule ll(b) has been violated. See 15 U.S.C. § 78-u4(c)(2) (2012); Coffee, The
Case for Preemption, supra note 108, at 4.
159. Coffee, The Case for Preemption, supra note 108, at 4.
/
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160
unsuccessful. The Court reasoned that the state law was not
161
purely procedural nor did it conflict with the FRCP. While the
state law required a bond upfront, it still had the same effect as
fee-shifting because the defendant would receive the bond if the
162
plaintiffs were unsuccessful. The main difference between the
bond requirement and a fee-shifting clause would be the timing of
putting up the money.163 Coffee distinguishes Cohen from lOb-5
claims on the grounds that: (1) Delaware has no substantive law
implementing fee-shifting; and (2) the holding from Cohen applies
164
solely to derivative actions. In contrast, lOb-5 class actions
must be brought in federal court, which has exclusive subject
165
matter jurisdiction over such claims.
But the fact still remains that bylaws are viewed as contracts
under Delaware law, which can modify the American Rule typi
166
cally used by Delaware courts. This leads back to an analysis
under Atlantic Marine. Coffee notes that under Atlantic Marine,
fee-shifting provisions need to be consistent with FRCP Rules
54(d)(2) and 23(h), which deal with notice and hearing require
16
ments. 7 It would not be a daunting task for corporate lawyers to
include language that complied with these rules, as they are not
168
restrictive. Furthermore, Coffee argues that broad, one-sided
fee-shifting conflicts with the policies enacted by Congress
9
through the PSLRA. rn Specifically, the PSLRA provides a "pre
sumption" in favor of fee-shifting if the court finds a violation of
110
FRCP Rule ll(b). The same conflict arose in Burlington Rail
road, with the Court pointing out the mandatory-versus
111
discretionary language of the bylaws and PSLRA. This is why,
160. 337 U.S. 541, 543, 557 (1949).
161. Id. at 555-56.
162. Id. at 544-45, 555.
163. Compare id. at 545 (requiring a bond to be posted prior to the case), with Coffee,
The Case for Preemption, supra note 108, at 6 (noting that fee-shifting requires payment of
expenses after the case is complete).
164. Coffee, The Case for Preemption, supra note 108, at 12 n.13.
165. Id.
166. See ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 558 (Del. 2014); Cof
fee, The Case for Preemption, supra note 108, at 4.
167. Coffee, The Case for Preemption, supra note 108, at 5.
168. See id. at 5-6 (explaining that FRCP Rules 54(d)(2) and 23(h) create minimal restrictions).
169. Id. at 7-8.
170. Id. at 8; see 15 U.S.C. § 78-u4(c) (2012).
171. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 7 (1987).
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as discussed in the next section, fee-shifting clauses, properly lim
ited to FOM cases, should be upheld under Atlantic Marine.
Forum-selection and arbitration clauses select "a decision mak
er and a set of rules, but do not change existing court proce
dure."112 The motives, method of adoption, and contractual rela
tionship between fee-shifting and forum-selection are almost
identical. The relationship between fee-shifting and arbitration
clauses is a little more indirect, in that there is federal law sup
porting enforcement of arbitration clauses. 173 One issue that re
mains unresolved is whether federal courts will enforce fee
shifting clauses. The remainder of this comment applies all the
implications and analyses previously discussed to fee-shifting
clauses specifically tailored to class action l0b-5 claims invoking
the FOM presumption of reliance. This application shows how
and why federal courts should enforce fee-shifting clauses that
are limited to the FOM presumption of reliance.

III.

THE GAMBIT LEVELS THE PLAYING FIELD FOR FRAUD-ON-THE
MARKET

The purpose of this section is to explain how and why fee
shifting provisions will solve the implications of Halliburton II,
discussed in Part I. The section looks at how tailored fee-shifting
clauses fit into the federal statutory scheme and case analysis de
scribed in Part II. The discussion then looks at Halliburton II's
potential effects on securities class action litigation. The section
concludes on the endgame of implementing fee-shifting provisions
and why such results are beneficial to both shareholders and cor
porations.
This comment is strictly limited to lOb-5 class actions invoking
Basie's FOM presumption of reliance. 171 The reason behind apply
ing fee-shifting clauses to this specific type of claim is so that
such clauses will hold up under judicial analysis, as previously
172. Winship, supra note 111, at 19.
173. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
174. See I3asic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 250 (1988). As already mentioned, a dis
cussion of the potential effects of broad, sweeping fee-shifting clauses, covering numerous
types of potential claims, is outside the scope of this comment. For a more detailed discus
sion on the broader scope of fee-shifting, see Winship, supra note 111, at 27-28; Sean J.
Griffith, Correcting Corporate Benefit: How to Fix Shareholder Litigation by Shifting the
Doctrine on Fees, 56 I3.C. L. REV. 1 (2015).
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discussed. 175 The solution presented by this comment seeks to
maintain Basie's presumption, while at the same time giving cor
porate defendants an economic opportunity to rebut the presump
tion. Fee-shifting clauses will prompt defendants not to seek early
settlement because it is more cost effective, and instead to rebut
the presumption. This will ultimately lead to a narrowing of the
issues in such claims and will also weed out frivolous cases by re
quiring plaintiffs to file suits with sufficient merits. 176 Further
more, such limited fee-shifting clauses will help the circularity
problem since cases will be less likely to settle and the sharehold
ers will not be merely transferring wealth from one pocket to an
other. The ultimate goal is the reduction in the number of such
claims, which have been empirically shown to destroy sharehold
er wealth. 177
IV. LIMITED SCOPE AND ENFORCEABILITY OF FEE-SHIFTING
PROVISIONS
Much of the commentary on fee-shifting clauses discusses their
use in terms of broad sweeping language and the consequences of
such provisions. 178 Many of these arguments are why this com
ment suggests fee-shifting clauses be narrowly tailored to the
class certification stage of lOb-5 class actions invoking Basie's
presumption of reliance. Corporate attorneys who draft fee
shifting provisions as proposed here will have to make sure the
scope of these fee-shifting clauses specifically relate to such
claims. The primary reason for sufficiently limiting the scope of
fee-shifting clauses is so that they will stand up to judicial scruti
ny and will provide a stronger case against preemption.
As previously discussed, the PSLRA added language to the '34
Act that creates a presumption of fee-shifting if the court finds a
violation of FRCP Rule ll(b). 179 A conflict arises because the lan
guage provided by the PSLRA allows for two-way fee-shifting,
while fee-shifting clauses would impose a mandatory one-way
175. See supra Part II.B.
176. These consequences of fee-shifting clauses fall in line with the policy reasons for
Congress enacting the PSLRA. See supra Part LB.
177. See U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 8, at 4.
178. See, e.g., Winship, supra note 111, at 5.
179. Coffee, The Case for Preemption, supra note 108, at 7-8; see 15 U.S.C. § 78-u4(c)
(2012).
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180
shifting of fees. As pointed out by Coffee, mandatory one-sided
fee-shifting is more punitive than a discretionary decision by the
181
courts. This conflict seems readily resolved in relation to l0b-5
claims invoking Basie's presumption. The PSLRA already has a
presumption of fee-shifting for bad faith cases violating FRCP
1"2
Rule ll(b). If the plaintiff class cannot make it past certification
due to price impact, this inherently leads us to believe that the
shareholders acted in bad faith in bringing the suit in the first
place, at least as a class action suit. 183 Remember: price impact is
181
a foundation for invoking Basie's presumption. Without price
impact, plaintiffs cannot be certified as a class under the FOM
presumption of reliance. 185 If the plaintiffs' allegations have mer
its, at least enough to prove price impact, then surely they would
pass certification. But, if there were a lack of price impact then
the mandatory sanctions of the PSLRA would be invoked due to a
violation of FRCP Rule ll(b)(3). 186

The FRCP already provides rules for the transfer and dismissal
of cases, and forum-selection clauses represent the "private order
187
ing" of such rules. In enacting the FAA, Congress provided ex
188
The
plicit support for enforcement of arbitration clauses.
PSLRA sets out rules for mandatory sanctions calling for fee
shifting, and fee-shifting clauses would be set out, as discussed in
189
this comment, to specifically enforce the rules already provided.
In analyzing fee-shifting clauses under Atlantic Marine, because
fee-shifting clauses would only require specific enforcement of
rules already laid out by the PSLRA, such clauses should be en
forceable. The fact that fee-shifting clauses would be one-sided
180. Coffee, The Case for Preemption, supra note 108, at 8.
181. Id.
182. See In re Star Gas Sec. Litig., 745 F. Supp. 2d 26, 38-40 (D. Conn. 2010) (imposing
fee-shifting on plaintiffs for filing frivolous securities fraud claims).
183. See Halliburton II, 573 U.S. _, _, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2416 (2014); see also supra
Part LC.
184. Halliburton II, 573 U.S. at_, 134 S. Ct. at 2416.
185. See id. at_, 134 S. Ct. at 2415.
186. FED. R. Crv. P. ll(b)(3) (requiring that "the factual contentions [made to the court]
have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary sup
port after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery"); see, e.g., In re
Star Gas Sec. Litig., 745 F. Supp. 2d at 36-37.
187. FED. R. Crv. P. 12(b)(2)-(3); Winship, supra note 111, at 13.
188. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
189. See supra Part II.B.
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(mandatory shifting of fees from defendant corporation to plaintiff
shareholders) does not indicate that the clause conflicts with the
PSLRA. 190 The one-sided fee-shifting clause and the two-way
mandatory sanctions of the PSLRA are not mutually exclusive.
Furthermore, simply making fee-shifting mandatory on one party
would not exclude the court from finding that a defendant violat
ed FRCP Rule ll(b), and therefore requiring a defendant corpora
tion to pay the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees.
Lastly, the language of such fee-shifting clauses should-and
will likely have to-contain language regarding claims against
the clause itself. It only seems fair to not enforce fee-shifting
clauses in claims alleging wrongdoing in the adoption of fee
shifting clauses. Presumably, these claims will be derivative ac
tions alleging a breach of duty by the board of directors who uni
laterally adopted a fee-shifting bylaw. But since, as recommended
above, the scope of a fee-shifting clause is limited to only l0b-5
class actions, this should not be an issue in the first place. 191
Proper limitations on the scope of fee-shifting clauses should
allow such clauses to withstand judicial analysis similar to that
which was applied to forum-selection and arbitration clauses.
This is because there are readily apparent relationships between
fee-shifting, forum-selection, and arbitration clauses. rn2 Thus, it
can be deduced that fee-shifting clauses applicable only to l0b-5
class actions are supported by Congress and logically do not cre
ate any dissonance with federal securities laws. The analysis of
fee-shifting clauses does not end here, however. The effects of fee
shifting will not only impact the wallets of parties involved in
l0b-5 class actions, but will also affect certain stages of litigation.
A. Effects on Litigation
One of the main implications of Halliburton II is that the deci
sion will ultimately lead to a "battle of the experts" as both sides

190. One-sided fee-shifting would enforce the mandatory sanctions of the PSLRA on
the plaintiffs if they violated FRCP Rule 1l(b) by insufficiently proving price impact, the
foundation of FOM reliance.
191. The scope of the fee-shifting clause will not cover breach of duty claims.
192. See supra Part II.B (discussing the similarities between an arbitration clause and
a fee-shifting clause).
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vie over price impact. 19:i After Halliburton II, defendants in lOb-5
class actions can rebut Basie's FOM presumption of reliance at
191
the class certification stage by proving lack of price impact. At
the time of this writing, there is not yet sufficient data to deter
mine whether Halliburton II will in fact cause more defendants to
attempt to rebut Basie's FOM presumption of reliance, instead of
taking the more cost effective route of settlement. Allowing corpo
rations to enforce fee-shifting clauses, however, will help incentiv
ize corporations to attempt to rebut Basie's FOM presumption.
As noted earlier, any attempts to rebut Basie's presumption by
the defendant will necessarily increase the costs of litigation ear
lier in the litigation process. 1% As such, plaintiffs will also in
crease the use of experts in anticipation of a defendant's attempts
to rebut plaintiffs' FOM reliance. 196 Furthermore, since price im
pact "event studies" look at each individual misrepresentation,
the amount of time experts will spend creating these event stud
ies will likely increase as well. 197 While the increase of costs can
be understood as a necessary evil resulting from Halliburton II,
the data and analysis presented by the experts will also shed
more light on the validity of plaintiffs' allegations. Presumably,
the conclusions from the event studies conducted by the defend
ants' experts will influence the defendants' choice to push forward
with litigation or settle.
If the event studies conducted by the defendants' experts tend
to show a lack of price impact, the defendants will attempt to re
8
but the FOM presumption at the class certification stage.rn Addi
tionally, the defendants' expectation of recouping litigation costs
associated with rebutting price impact will further sway defend
ants against settlement. At this point, the plaintiffs will offer
their event studies showing price impact. Since both sides are
now presenting analyses of each misrepresentation, the court will

193. See supra Part LC. Plaintiffs will attempt to prove price impact either indirectly
or directly, and defendants will attempt to directly prove a lack of price impact.
194. Halliburton II, 573 U.S._,_, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2417 (2014).
195. See supra Part LC.
196. See Streett & Pennington, supra note 72, at 4 (predicting that the class certifica
tion stage will become a battle of the experts).
197. See id. This is assuming that the plaintiff class alleges that the corporation made
multiple misrepresentations.
198. See supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
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be able to consider much more evidence in determining whether
to certify the class.
However, if the event studies conducted by the defendants' ex
perts tend to show there was in fact price impact, and the plain
tiffs are successfully certified as a class, defendants will be faced
with a double-edged sword. One edge will push defendants to set
tle, since a settlement award will be less than the damages
awarded by a court. The other edge of the sword acts as a bar
gaining chip for plaintiffs. If defendants do not offer any evidence
rebutting price impact, this naturally leads to the assumption
that there was some amount of price impact, in which case the
plaintiff class will have more leverage in settlement negotiations.
It is important to point out that this edge of the sword does not
solve the circularity problem with securities class action settle
ments. 199 However, plaintiffs will now be less willing to settle, as
their chances of prevailing on the claim seem more probable.
Assuming the plaintiffs use this leverage to obtain a higher
settlement amount based on event studies produced by the plain
tiffs' experts, a judge can simply compare the size of the price im
pact with the settlement amount.200 However, the high frequency
of settlement has been identified as one of the major issues con
cerning securities class actions due to inadequate compensa
tion.201 The problem of inadequate settlement awards is one of the
major factors that show class action litigation destroys share
holder wealth.202 It is important to note that class action settle
ments require judicial approval.203 However, the problem is that
judges typically do not have enough evidence in front of them to
decide whether a particular amount is fair.20' A detailed explana
tion of the settlement analysis is outside the scope of this com
ment,205 but typically the analysis "amount[s] to asking only
whether the relief does rough justice to the claim."206 The incen199. See supra Part LC.
200. If the settlement award is too low, the judge will also be able to use the event
studies to ascertain an equitable settlement award.
201. U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 8, at 5-6.
202. See id. at 6. Plaintiffs attorneys usually take a substantial percentage of any settlement award before distributions are paid to the plaintiff class. Id. at 5.
203. Griffith, supra note 174, at 19.
204. See id. at 20.
205. For a more thorough analysis, see generally id. at 19-25.
206.

Id. at 20.
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tive to rebut price impact provided by fee-shifting clauses will
provide judges with the necessary evidence to better assess set
tlement agreements. Judges will be able to review the event stud
ies from both parties, and will have to reconcile any differences
between the amounts of impact on the price. Ultimately, judges
will be provided more with insight into the merits of the claim.

B. Endgame
The purpose of fee-shifting clauses proposed by this comment is
to solve major problems currently affecting securities litigation.
The potential burden on plaintiffs will incentivize plaintiffs to
bring stronger cases, supported by better evidence. If plaintiffs
bring weak claims, defendants would now be incentivized to rebut
price impact, and, if successful, could recover litigation costs as
sociated with doing so. By incentivizing defendants to rebut price
impact and guaranteeing recoupment of litigation costs if success
ful, the circularity problem is diminished. 207 The problem will not
completely vanish, but the incentives of fee-shifting clauses will
reduce the number of settlements currently fueling the problem
of circularity.
Fee-shifting clauses are intended to deter frivolous and merit
less claims. One obvious consequence of a fee-shifting clause is
that it puts plaintiffs in the situation that corporations currently
face: paying the fees of both sides. 208 This potential burden on
plaintiffs will act as a deterrent. A fee-shifting clause will force
plaintiffs to bring claims that they know or reasonably believe
will survive class certification, to avoid paying the defendants' at
torneys' fees. 209 While deterrence is the main purpose of fee
shifting clauses, the limited scope of the clauses proposed by this
comment will not completely eliminate securities class action
suits; the potential burden on plaintiffs will simply weed out
speculative claims. The effects of fee-shifting clauses could even
potentially benefit the plaintiffs. One potential benefit is that the

207.
208.
209.

See supra Part III.
Bainbridge, Privately Ordered Solution, supra note 106.
See Greene, supra note 64; Liz Hoffman, Shareholder Suits

May Prove Costly: Rul
ing Upholds Bylaw Requiring Loser to Pay Winner's Legal Fees, WALL S'1'. J. (May 18,
2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304908304579565850165670972.
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plaintiff class is more likely to succeed at trial on the merits since
class certification will require stronger proof of price impact. 210
By requiring plaintiffs who cannot make it past the class certi
fication state to pay the corporation's attorneys' fees, the circular
ity problem is diminished. As noted previously, the problem of
circularity arises because shareholders receive any settlement
amount from a defendant corporation. 211 Since shareholders are
the investors in a corporation, any amount paid by the corpora
212
tion decreases the value of the corporation. If a defendant is
able to prove a lack of price impact and the court decides not to
certify the class, this is the end of the class action suit. At this
point, assuming a district court applies the American Rule, the
shareholders will still see a decrease in the value of their invest
ment in the corporation. This is because the corporation incurred
substantial litigation costs. While under the American Rule, the
plaintiff class will have to pay their own litigation costs, so the
costs to the corporation are not doubled. 213 However, by adopting a
fee-shifting clause, defendants would be able to recover their liti
gation costs and thus restore shareholder value.
Several possible outcomes are likely to occur if a corporation
can stop a claim at the certification stage. One outcome is that
the parties will enter into settlement agreements favoring the
corporation. 214 This assumes the settlement agreement will not
require the corporation to pay the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees. The
other outcome is that the corporation will move to recover fees ac
cording to its fee-shifting clause. Again, the corporation will not
be paying the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees. Because corporations will
not have to incur the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, and will recover
their litigation costs, shareholder value is restored. The effect of
210. See Frankel, supra note 64.
211. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
212. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. This is assuming the shareholders of
the plaintiff class remain shareholders of the corporation from the beginning of the class
period through the payment of the settlement. As noted earlier, shareholder wealth can
further decline if the shareholders of the plaintiff class differ from the current sharehold
ers. U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 42, at 6.
213. Griffith, supra note 174, at 6.
214. A settlement favoring the corporation can take on numerous forms. For example,
the settlement agreement could require the corporation to pay nothing. At the very least
corporations will likely push for an agreement that does not require them to pay the plain
tiffs attorneys' fees. See U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 8, at 19 (not
ing that on average, plaintiffs' attorneys' fees were 18% of the settlement).
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fee-shifting clauses does impose a heavy burden on plaintiffs if
they are unable to certify as class. However, this heavy burden
seems necessary due to the ineffectiveness of current deterrence
methods. 21''
It is worth mentioning that the problem of circularity is not re
solved by fee-shifting clauses if the defendant is not able to defeat
class certification. In addressing this concern, fee-shifting clauses
will also deter corporations from settlement in cases based on
speculative allegations since they will have a higher probability of
rebutting price impact. As noted earlier, the problems with cur
rent settlement agreements are the root of the circularity problem
and inadequate consideration. 216 As more cases move on to trial,
the awarding of attorneys' fees is left to the courts. This is be
cause the scope of the fee-shifting clauses proposed by this com
ment does not cover decisions reached on the merits. The type of
fee-shifting clauses proposed here will only require plaintiffs to
reimburse the defendant if they fail to certify as a class.
Corporations that adopt such clauses clearly seek to deter
frivolous securities litigation. By adopting a fee-shifting clause,
corporations will set up a defensive strategy that provides several
benefits. First, the amount of claims brought against the corpora
tion will decrease. This is because speculative claims are less like
ly to be brought as plaintiffs consider the potential burden of a
fee-shifting clause. Second, even if claims are brought, defendants
are now incentivized to rebut price impact. If successful, the de
fendants will recover their litigation costs and the shareholders'
investments will be restored.

V.

IMPLICATIONS OF FEE-SHIFTING PROVISIONS

The adoption of fee-shifting clauses tailored to l0b-5 class ac
tions will cause a substantial change in current securities litiga
tion. The purpose of this section is to identify several apparent
implications for corporations adopting fee-shifting clauses. While
the scope of this comment is limited to l0b-5 class actions, the
commentary on the future of fee-shifting clauses has primarily fo
cused on broad fee-shifting clauses. However, any action taken
215.
216.

See Bainbridge, Privately Ordered Solution, supra not/106.
See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
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against the adoption of broad fee-shifting clauses could necessari
ly impact the more limited fee-shifting clauses proposed here. The
most apparent implication is that fee-shifting will be at the fore
front of future legislative action. The analysis of this section looks
at the extreme ends of the spectrum for legislative action; either
full support of or outright bans on fee-shifting clauses. The analy
sis first looks at state legislative action. The section concludes
with an analysis of congressional action and SEC regulation.
There is a high probability that state legislatures will enact
legislation regarding fee-shifting clauses. Again, the focus here is
on Delaware. In fact, such action was already seen in the wake of
the ATP Tour decision. 217 On one end of the spectrum, if Delaware
embraces fee-shifting clauses, there will be a flood of corporations
adopting such fee-shifting bylaws. 218 It is also likely that every
new IPO will include some type of fee-shifting clause in the corpo
ration's articles. 219 Furthermore, with Delaware's predominance
in corporate law, other states could potentially follow in Dela
ware's steps. 220 At first, this will lead to a flood of litigation over
the adoption of fee-shifting clauses. 221 This flood will not easily be
tamed since broad fee-shifting clauses will cover numerous ac
tions, and courts will have to make decisions on a case-by-case
basis. 222
On the other end of the spectrum, if Delaware bans the use of
fee-shifting clauses outright, the state runs the risk of losing its
competitive edge as the predominant state of incorporation. 223 In
fact, Oklahoma has already adopted a fee-shifting bill requiring
the losing party in derivative suits to pay the prevailing party's
217. See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text. At the time of this writing, the
Delaware legislature had tabled discussions of fee-shifting clauses until early 2015. See
Rickard, supra note 1.
218. See Coffee, The Case for Preemption, supra note 108, at 1. There are already a
growing number of companies adopting such bylaws, and support from the Delaware legis
lature will give the go-ahead to any corporations currently on the fence about fee-shifting
bylaws. Id.
219. See id.
220. Id. at 2.
221. Claims will likely be brought as a breach of duty by the board of directors. See Jeff
C. Dodd & James Edward Maloney, Delaware Supreme Court Finds Fee-Shifting Bylaw
Permissible, ANDREWSKUin'H (May 15, 2014), http://www.andrewskurth.com/assets/pdf/
article_1074.pdf.
222. Presumably courts will apply the ATP Tour analysis. See supra Part II.A.
223. See Coffee, The Case for Preemption, supra note 108, at 2.
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reasonable litigation costs including attorneys' fees.221 Oklahoma
has taken a significant step regarding fee-shifting, as the bill ap
plies to every derivative action in the state.225 This is a substan
tial departure from a corporation's deliberate choice of adopting
fee-shifting clauses. One major consequence of companies decid
ing to incorporate in other states would be a severe negative im
pact on a major source of revenue for Delaware.226 Thus, it is like
ly that Delaware will take some form of action regarding fee
shifting clauses.
Since action taken on the extreme ends of the spectrum will in
herently lead to extreme consequences, it is more likely that Del
aware will modify or limit the use of fee-shifting clauses. While
the support of broadly written fee-shifting clauses could cause a
serious chill on securities litigation, it will also lead to more liti
gation regarding the scope of the fee-shifting clauses. 227 However,
if Delaware severely restricts fee-shifting clauses, it will almost
certainly lead to companies choosing to incorporate in other
states. Regardless, the bottom line is that it is unlikely that the
Delaware legislature will leave the topic untouched.
Since the use of fee-shifting clauses in l0b-5 claims will be ad
dressed in federal courts, action taken by Congress or the SEC
will also have a significant impact. rrhe difference between the
analysis of congressional action and that of state action primarily
deals with the ineffectiveness of deterrence by the PSLRA and
228
SLUSA. This ineffectiveness has led to a decline in the reputa
tion and competitiveness of the United States' capital markets
and business environment.229 Domestic and foreign companies
view the U.S. business environment as litigious.230 This view has
224. Kevin Lacroix, Oklahoma Legislature Adopts Derivative Litigation Fee-Shifting
Provision, D&O DIARY (Sept. 25, 2014), http://www.dandodiary.com/2014/09/articles/corpo
rate-governance/oklahoma-legislature-adopts-derivative-litigation-fee-shifting-provision/.
LaCroix points out that the Oklahoma bill is much narrower than the fee-shifting bylaw
approved by the Delaware Supreme Court. Id.
225. Id.
226. The revenue generated by incorporation fees and franchise taxes has the ability to
comprise 30% of Delaware's budget. Delaware lawyers have a substantial influence over
the state legislature. See Bainbridge, Public Choice Lens, supra note 101.
227. See Coffee, The Case for Preemption, supra note 108, at 2; see also supra Part IV.
228. See supra text accompanying notes 39-49, 139-45.
229. Bainbridge, Privately Ordered Solution, supra note 106.
230. Id. (citing Stephen J. Choi, Assessing the Cost of Regulatory Protections: Evidence
on the Decision to Sell Securities Outside the United States 4 (Yale Law & Econ., Research
/
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prompted many foreign companies to move back overseas and al
so creates a strong incentive for foreign companies to remain
overseas.231 These notions, coupled with the empirical data show
ing that the current system of securities litigation ultimately
leads to the destruction of shareholder wealth,232 should provide
plenty of motivation for Congress to seriously consider reform.
Again, measures taken on the extreme ends of the spectrum
will likely cause more harm than good. For example, a complete
ban on fee-shifting clauses will, at a minimum, allow current
problems to continue. 233 An action in full support of broad fee
shifting clauses as related to securities litigation, on the other
hand, has the potential to severely limit securities class actions,
which provide valuable anti-fraud regulation.231
These implications and concerns should signal to the SEC that
the future of fee-shifting clauses should be given serious consid
eration. While testifying to the SEC Investor Advisory Commit
tee, Coffee laid out four potential actions that the SEC could take
against fee-shifting clauses.235 First, the SEC, as amicus curiae,
could assert federal preemption in cases with no FRCP Rule 11
violation.236 Second, the SEC could refuse to accelerate registra
tion statements of companies with a fee-shifting clause in their
articles or bylaws.2'37 Third, the SEC could require companies to
acknowledge in their registration forms that fee-shifting clauses
conflict with federal securities laws.238 Lastly, the SEC could re
quire IPOs to disclose fee-shifting clauses as a major "risk fac
tor."23u In discussing these potential actions, Coffee also provides
Paper No. 253, Mar. 21, 2001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=267506).
231. See id. (citing MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG & CHARU;s E. SCHUMER, SUSTAINING NEW
YORK'S AND TIIE US' GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP 75, 77 (2007); Howell E.
Jackson, Summary of Research Findings on Extra-Territorial Application of Federal Secu
rities Law, in GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS & THE U.S. SECURITIES LAWS 2009: STRATEGIES
FOR THE CHANGING REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 1243, 1253-54 (Practicing Law Inst.
2009)).
232. See id.; U.S. CHMlllER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 8, at 5-6.
233. See supra note 223 and accompanying text (describing the possible effects of a
complete ban in Delaware).
234. See Bainbridge, Privately Ordered Solution, supra note 106 (describing how current securities litigation deters fraud).
235. Coffee, The Case for Preemption, supra note 108, at 8-9.
236. Id. at 8.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 9.
239. Id.
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insight into their shortcomings. One example, relating to requir
ing disclosures, is that investors will be unable to assess any de
crease in the value of a company's stock if it contains a fee
shifting clause, because they will not know the probability of cor
porate insiders breaching their fiduciary duties. 210 In light of Cof
fee's testimony, the SEC could also take this opportunity to try
and fix current problems with securities litigation. Once again, an
effective solution by the SEC will attempt to find a happy medi
um between the extreme ends of the spectrum. It will likely be in
the SEC's best interest to get out in front of the imminent con
frontation of fee-shifting clauses. Establishing control early in the
debate will help avoid landing on either of the extreme ends of
the spectrum.
The enforceability of fee-shifting clauses has the ability to
make substantial changes to securities class action litigation. The
implications of these clauses have fueled a strong debate on their
appropriateness in the corporate world. 211 Legislative action
seems imminent as more and more corporations are starting to
212
adopt fee-shifting clauses into their articles or bylaws. However,
there is not a simple yes or no answer as to whether fee-shifting
clauses should be allowed. Legislatures and regulatory agencies
will need to take into consideration the potential consequences of
their actions. Ideally, as this comment suggests, legislatures and
the SEC will be able to find a happy medium that allows for fee
shifting clauses in limited situations, which will be a step towards
solving the current problems of securities litigation.
CONCLUSION

This comment lays out a framework that should allow corpora
tions to strategically defend themselves against frivolous and
meritless l0b-5 class action suits invoking Basie's FOM presump
tion of reliance. After Halliburton II, corporate defendants are
able to rebut a plaintiffs' FOM presumption of reliance at the
class certification stage by offering evidence that the corporation's
misrepresentations did not cause a price impact on the corpora240. Id. at 9.
241. See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text (explaining the debate currently
facing Delaware legislature regarding whether or not to prohibit fee-shifting clauses).
242. See Coffee, The Case for Preemption, supra note 108, at 1.

/

1358

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:1321

tion's stock. 21a In theory, this should inspire defendant corpora
tions to attempt to rebut the presumption. This theory stands in
contrast to empirical analysis showing that most of these claims,
pre-Halliburton II, settled. 211 Furthermore, other studies show
that these settlements typically destroy shareholder wealth. 245 By
allowing corporations to adopt fee-shifting clauses, narrowly tai
lored to l0b-5 class actions invoking Basie's FOM presumption of
reliance, defendant corporations will be sufficiently incentivized
to rebut the presumption when the plaintiffs' price impact claims
are speculative. Since plaintiffs will need to be prepared to defend
against defendants' rebuttal of price impact, plaintiffs should be
aware of the strength of their argument. A speculative set of facts
alleging price impact will not establish class-wide reliance, which
is the foundation for l0b-5 class action claims. If plaintiffs are
unable to establish the foundation of their claim, with evidence
they knew beforehand, the courts should view such claims as
frivolous and in violation of FRCP Rule 11. The PSLRA already
presumes in favor of awarding attorneys fees for violations of
FRCP Rule 11, and fee-shifting clauses simply seek to enforce
that presumption.
By analyzing fee-shifting clauses under both forum-selection
clauses and arbitration clauses currently used in corporate arti
cles and bylaws, one can see a foundation for the adoption and en
forceability of fee-shifting clauses. The primary purpose of fee
shifting clauses is to help cure glaring defects in the current secu
rities litigation regime. First, fee-shifting clauses will help deter
frivolous or meritless claims by placing a potentially heavy bur
den on the plaintiffs. Second, fee-shifting clauses, in some situa
tions, will help cure the circularity problem with shareholder liti
gation by actually restoring shareholder wealth. Fee-shifting
clauses, as proposed by this comment, will not put an end to class
action securities litigation, since plaintiffs with merit-based cases
should and will make it past the class certification stage. Fur
thermore, corporations do make a sacrifice by adopting fee
shifting clauses. The incentives to rebut a FOM presumption can
sometimes leave the corporation wielding a double-edged sword.
There have yet to be any decisions from the courts regarding the
243. Halliburton II, 573 U.S._,_, 134 S. Ct. 2:398, 2417 (2014).
244. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
245. See U.S. CHAMllER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 8, at 4.
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enforceability of fee-shifting clauses. This leaves the door open to
both legislative action and federal preemption. Some type of legis
lative or regulatory action is imminent, as the stakes are set high
for both sides of the debate. However, the limited scope of the fee
shifting clauses proposed in this comment strike a happy medium
that will help cure the current problems of lOb-5 class action liti
gation.
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